How to Motivate People to do What YOU Want 4

By Chris Simmons

As the Collections Chief for NATO’s intelligence battalion, I ran the alliance’s “Human Intelligence” efforts, gathering information from people throughout Bosnia and Croatia. It was a target-rich environment and on a daily basis, we received information on local obstruction of the Dayton Peace Accords, refugee issues, war criminals, and terrorists.

“Bosnia” actually consisted of three distinct governments: a weak state-level institution (i.e., Bosnia) with two highly autonomous parts, the Croat-Bosniak Federation and the Serb-majority Republika Srpska (RS). Each entity had its own government, parliament and presidency. The redundancies were mind-numbing and hardliners made a game of finding new and creative ways to subvert the 1995 peace treaty which ended the three and a half-year war.

In one area, the local power company was led by Bosnian-Croat militants. These hardliners decided to upgrade the power to their faction’s neighborhoods and install power grids into newly-established Croat communities. Not surprisingly, this action was undertaken to the detriment of the local Serb and Bosniak enclaves.

Clearly, the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) had to respond or risk having hardliners from all three factions mimic this new form of obstruction. We could have used our authority to simply order the offending power company to cease and desist, but opted against it. The likelihood of success was low and would have required lots of manpower and daily supervision. Instead, we came up with our own highly-creative countermeasure.

Local support for the power company’s misconduct was minimal. The Bosnian-Croats wanted to move forward with the peace process, as did the other ethnic groups. We also knew that getting the local citizenry involved in ending the bad behavior would be more effective than any unilateral action SFOR could take. As such, we can up with a plan which would teach all three factions an important lesson.

We understood far too well the truth of the old adage, “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men do nothing.” Local support wasn’t sufficient – we needed the citizenry to take action on the beliefs they held so strongly. So we offered an incentive. As co-authors Steven Levitt & Stephen Dubner would later point out in their best-selling book Freakonomics, there are three forms of incentives:

–        Moral: People don’t want to do something they believe to be wrong;

–        Social: People don’t want to be seen doing something wrong;

–        Economic:  People want to avoid financial and property penalties.

We also knew the most successful behavior modification campaigns often involved all three incentive styles. As such, we went to the remaining local utility companies, which were run by the other factions, and had them suspend service to the Bosnian-Croat communities. We then spread the word throughout the area, encouraging everyone (not just the Bosnian-Croats) to contact the power company and its employees and ask them to comply with the peace accord. The overlapping incentives achieved immediate results. Additionally, as word spread throughout the country about our new community-based tactic, its success dissuaded all three ethnic groups from ever again attempting to use utilities as a weapon against one another.

Influencing people to do what you want is easier than one might imagine. This is especially true in scenarios like the one above, where the belief system of the targeted audience already overlapped with the message sender, i.e., SFOR. When starting from a point of shared interest, modest incentives are often sufficient to achieve the desired results.

Breaking the Serbs: The High Price of a Single Misjudgment Reply

Map of Bosnia

By Chris Simmons

For weeks, anticipation had been building within the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). One of the deadlines for demilitarization was now just days away and it was unclear whether the rival blocs that constituted Bosnia-Herzegovina would meet the suspense.

“Bosnia” actually consisted of three distinct governments: a weak state-level institution (i.e., Bosnia) with two highly autonomous parts, the Croat-Bosniak Federation and the Serb-majority Republika Srpska (RS). Each entity had its own government, parliament and presidency. The redundancies were mind-numbing. It was a bureaucracy gone mad, making interactions between NATO and the Bosnian governments problematic at best.

On Monday, the entities were to inform NATO whether they would meet the demining threshold required by the Dayton Peace Accords. The Croat-Bosniak response came first:  they were done, three days ahead of schedule. Then we learned the RS Minister of Defense would appear via Video-Teleconference (VTC) during the evening meeting at NATO’s Sarajevo headquarters. This, we all knew, was not a good sign.

That night, the Minister came on the VTC and told the SFOR Commander the Republic of Srpska (pronounced “Serp-Ska) would not meet the deadline. He professed his desire to help, but said the Justice Minister had ruled the Dayton Accord’s demining requirement unconstitutional. The SFOR Commander, who saw the action as nothing more than political brinksmanship, was not amused. He reminded the RS General that his government had signed the Accord four years earlier. “You will meet your obligations,” the Minister was told before the SFOR Commander abruptly ended the broadcast.

Turning to his Intelligence Staff, the SFOR Commander asked how close the RS was to meeting the suspense. “No where close,” he was told. A weapons specialist stood and advised the General the RS had well over 200,000 mines that still needed to be rendered safe. “There isn’t a country in the world that could de-militarize that many landmines in three days” the analyst concluded. It was clear to everyone the RS had been planning to obstruct the peace treaty for some time.

The SFOR Commander directed his staff to identify the three best units in the RS Army and to secretly make plans to seize their equipment and start discharging their personnel at 12:01am Friday morning. For the next two days, their Defense Minister continued to blame the Justice Ministry. Finally, at Thursday’s VTC, the RS General gleefully announced that the Ministry had reversed itself – the Dayton Accord was constitutional. All he required was an extension of the suspense. The SFOR Commander responded with words to the effect, “You’ll have my answer tomorrow.”

At one minute after midnight, NATO forces surrounded the garrisons of the RS’ three premier units. Entering the compounds, the soldiers were awakened and all of their weapons and equipment seized. Standing in formation, they learned they were being discharged – effective immediately. By dawn, the “crown jewels” of the RS military had ceased to exist.

This bold move broke the back of institutionalized resistance by the RS government. Henceforth, they were as compliant – if not more so, than their Croat-Bosniak counterparts. And the RS military set a record for the fastest destruction of 200,000+ landmines……

The Hunt For “Bad Monika” Reply

Monika Simonovic

Pursuit of War Criminal Fostered Positive, Yet Unintended, Consequences

By Chris Simmons

Monika Simonović was a Serb guard at Brcko’s (pronounced “Birch-koo) notorious Luka detention camp in northeastern Bosnia. Reportedly just 18 year’s old when she first began handling the Croat and Muslim prisoners, her barbaric behavior quickly earned her the moniker, the “Female Monster.” Many people said she looked like a little girl, but witnesses provided evidence that in 1992, she participated in some of the worst atrocities of the war.

In Bosnia as a peace-keeper, I was the Collections Chief for NATO’s intelligence battalion. I ran the alliance’s “Human Intelligence” efforts, gathering information from over 200 “sources” living throughout Bosnia and Croatia. Our collection requirements were diverse: refugee issues, Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWCs) (i.e., war criminals), demilitarization of the former combatants, corruption, terrorism, etc.

Our holdings on Simonović were extensive and the information so graphic and disturbing that no one ever read her entire case file without stopping to emotionally regroup. From 1992-1995, she was renowned for routinely beating prisoners with fire hoses and batons. However, Simonović was best known for her more horrific crimes, to include slicing open a man’s stomach with a broken beer bottle and dissecting a pregnant woman to remove her fetus.

Unindicted for some inexplicable reason, I nonetheless made the unilateral decision to hunt her down. Tagging her with the nickname “Bad Monika,” I assigned our Tuzla-based intelligence collectors with the lead on this mission, a tasking they enthusiastically embraced.

The first and only unindicted war criminal we actively pursued, Simonović had earned herself a long and distinguished list of enemies. As word spread throughout our source network, information quickly began to flow in. Several weeks into the nationwide chase, we were just 30-minutes behind her. Afraid for the first time in her life,” she used every available resource to elude capture. In a heartbreaking turn of events, “Bad Monika” vanished into thin air.

Despite her escape, our pursuit of Simonović triggered a series of welcome, but unexpected and unintended consequences. As our hunt intensified, rumors spread throughout Bosnia and Croatia about the existence of a “Secret” PIFWC list. The logic behind the rumor was that since NATO had never previously pursued unindicted war criminals, clearly there had to be two rosters – one public list and a newly-established secret one. Additionally, NATO declined to refute the existence of a “Secret” list, leading both the general public and war criminals throughout the region to see it as confirmation.

The quality and quantity of reporting on all major war criminals soared, causing further panic among these criminals. Some fled to other countries, while others went deeper into hiding. Regardless, the previously public existence of these individuals ended, creating the public perception that the nation was another step closer to a lasting peace. And thus, the sense of stability deepened throughout the nation.

Note:  Monika Simonović evaded justice for another 11 years, apparently living for much of that time in neighboring Serbia under a false name. On December 20, 2011, police officials found and arrested her in the northwestern city of Prijedor, Bosnia. Her husband, Goran Jelisic, with whom she worked at the Luka camp, had been sentenced to 40 years in jail by the U.N. war crimes tribunal in 2001. Likewise, her brother, Konstantin, who commanded the camp, had also been previously arrested and incarcerated.

Not a Good Day to Die Reply

By Chris Simmons

Death came calling that warm spring evening in the form of an indicted war criminal and his entourage of 15 bodyguards.

In Bosnia as a peace-keeper, I was the Collections Chief for NATO’s intelligence battalion. I ran the alliance’s “Human Intelligence” efforts, gathering information from over 200 “sources” living throughout Bosnia and Croatia. Our collection requirements were diverse: refugee issues, Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWCs) (i.e., war criminals), demilitarization of the former combatants, corruption, terrorism, etc.

Running successful espionage operations required an aggressive, hands-on approach. As a result, I was frequently in the field with my collectors helping them improve their “tradecraft,” that is, their “source” handling skills. On this particular day, my colleagues and I had just finished an extraordinarily fruitful day with our collectors in Tuzla, a 6,000-year old town in northeast Bosnia. To celebrate, we decided to go off base and have dinner in the city. As “shallow-cover” collectors, we drove unmarked civilian vehicles rather than the “Humvees” used by the rest of the peace-keepers. Military convoys were easy for the “bad guys” to spot and avoid, whereas we blended in with all the other commercial vehicles on the road.

The restaurant’s parking lot was empty when we arrived, so we spread the vehicles out to minimize attention. Everyone in our group was openly armed as we walked in. Additionally, several carried MP5-SDs (German sub-machineguns with silencers) in their innocently-appearing backpacks and carry bags.

We were early into our meal when the Specter of Death arrived. A well-known PIFWC and his bodyguards pulled into the parking lot. Recognizing him on sight, everyone drew their weapons, but kept them hidden under the table while we quickly assessed options. They had a slight edge in manpower, but we had the element of surprise – they couldn’t see us through the restaurant’s tinted windows. On the downside, our additional ammunition was outside in our vehicles.

Surrounded by a phalanx of bodyguards, our PIFWC remained near his vehicles while a small “advance team” approached the restaurant. Once they were through the second set of doors, we’d be face-to-face and the situation would explode. “Everybody stay cool. I’ve got this,” yelled Nick as he jumped to his feet. A Brit with extensive service in Northern Ireland, Nick was the #2 man at our Tuzla company. “You,” he commanded one of the waiters, “When I signal, you open the second set of doors and greet them.” The server did as ordered.

Weapon holstered and elbows tight by his side, Nick held his hands mid-chest with his fingers spread. Approaching from their blind side, he calmly announced “Everybody relax, we’re here to have a nice relaxing dinner just like you.” Having drawn their attention away from the rest of us, the advance team now realized they were grossly outnumbered and – with the outer doors now closed – out of contact with the rest of their group. Voice calm and reassuring, Nick continued moving slowly towards them without breaking eye contact. “Let’s call a truce for tonight. Nobody gets shot and your boss doesn’t get arrested…at least not tonight,” Nick quipped with a slight smirk. The gallows humor provoked nervous laughter from the bodyguards. “Agreed,” replied their lead man.

Calmly placing a hand on his upper arm, Nick “asked” his bodyguard counterpart “How about you go back outside and tell your boss we’ve made a deal. It’s good for tonight only and if anyone asks, none of us were ever here.” Nick’s skillful handling of the situation prompted a most welcome but unexpectedly humorous response: “As your colleagues from down under would say, no worries mate!” Turning to the remaining bodyguards, their chief told two to stay with their new found friend while one accompanied him back outside.

The two briefed the PIFWC and the rest of the protective detail. Visibly apprehensive, they become collectively calmer as reality set in. The truce was their only way out. The forces were too evenly matched for a gunfight and even if some of them survived, they knew we would never allow the PIFWC to leave the parking lot alive. Conversely, if they turned around and left, that would break the truce and trigger an immediate nationwide manhunt. Outplayed, they entered the restaurant, each man nodding as they passed our table. We nodded back and watched as they sat down at a table on the other side of the restaurant. Still terrified, the staff temporarily closed the eatery to other diners.

Ninety minutes later, our meal finished, we rose to leave. As we did, Nick strode over to their table, made eye contact with the PIFWC and then his entire detail. He calmly thanked them for accepting our invitation to a temporary truce. “There’ll be no trouble tonight,” he reassured them, before turning and walking out with the rest of us.

The meeting of my intelligence collectors and a heavily-guarded PIFWC was akin to putting together a King Cobra and a mongoose. The survival of one required the death of the other. So it was for us, collectively, that warm spring evening in Tuzla.

Nick saved everyone’s lives that day by following the 1st Rule of Human Nature:  Self-Interest Trumps Everything. Our PIFWC’s self-interest – and that of his guards – focused on two complimentary goals: avoid death (immediate need) and preclude capture/arrest (long-term need). Our immediate self-interest was identical to the “bad guys:” survive tonight. Our long-term interest, however, was to see our PIFWC arrested at some point in the near future and we were absolutely confident we would accomplish that goal.

However, understanding human nature wasn’t enough to keep everyone alive. Nick’s masterful use of body gestures, personal space, and vocals (i.e., tone, pitch, voice speed & word choice) pushed the PIFWC’s assemblage to agree to a solution they were already pre-disposed to accept. Additionally, we knew the mind’s tendency towards self-deception would work to our favor. Our PIFWC certainly thought that if NATO was willing to call a truce that night, it was possible the alliance might be amenable to an arrangement that would let him avoided a war crimes trial. The key fallacy with this self-deception was that we weren’t NATO personified. We were simply a team of collectors who – while willing to die if needed — wanted to live to see another sunrise.

Thankfully, for one brief shining moment during that tension-filled evening, everyone’s immediate self-interest was fulfilled. Shortly thereafter, our PIFWC was captured and flown to The Hague for trial.